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Abstract
This is a simulation model that intends to integrate macro dynam-
ics with structural and sectoral features that shape and modify it. It is
an attempt to analyze the macrodynamic eﬀective demand eﬀects of
endogenous structural changes in the same setup. Micro-macro inter-
actions result in the model from each level having its own dynamics
dependent on the inputs it receives from the others. Each sector is
modeled according to neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary microfounda-
tions, with additional unorthodox micro behavioral assumptions. To-
gether with exogenous foreign and government sectors, they are inte-
grated into a multisectoral model. The main features of the model are:
(1) simulated sectoral trajectories of a stylized economy derive from
endogenous competitive dynamics as well as direct (input-output) and
indirect (income, consumption) interactions; (2) sectors are distin-
guished according to their role in the productive structure and demand
categories – consumption, intermediate and capital; (3) no equilib-
rium is assumed: dynamic interactions among ﬁrms’ decisions (based
on adaptive expectations) and their eﬀects generate open-ended tra-
jectories. Even though the simulation results presented in this paper
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only give a very brief idea of the trajectories generated by the model,
a general robust result is obtained: the cyclical behavior of the GDP
and its main aggregate components.
Keywords: Multisectoral Growth Models
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Este ´ e um modelo de simula¸ c˜ ao que pretende integrar a
macrodinˆ amica com aspectos estruturais e setoriais que a con-
formam e modiﬁcam. ´ E uma tentativa de analisar os efeitos
macrodinˆ amicos, em termos de demanda efetiva, de mudan¸ cas
estruturais end´ ogenas no mesmo arcabou¸ co. Intera¸ c˜ oes micro-
macro no modelo decorrem da dinˆ amica pr´ opria de cada n´ ıvel,
ao responder aos comandos recebidos dos demais. Cada setor ´ e
modelado com base em microfundamentos neo-Schumpeterianos
evolucion´ arios, acrescidos de hip´ oteses comportamentais micro
n˜ ao-ortodoxas. Juntamente com os setores externo e governa-
mental, eles s˜ ao integrados em um modelo multissetorial. As
caracter´ ısticas b´ asicas do modelo s˜ ao: (1) trajet´ orias setoriais
simuladas de uma economia estilizada s˜ ao derivadas de uma
dinˆ amica competitiva end´ ogena, bem como de suas intera¸ c˜ oes di-
retas (insumo-produto) e indiretas (renda, consumo); (2) os se-
tores se distinguem por sua inser¸ c˜ ao na estrutura produtiva e nas
categorias de demanda – consumo, intermedi´ arios e capital; (3)
n˜ ao h´ a nenhum pressuposto de equil´ ıbrio: intera¸ c˜ oes dinˆ amicas
entre decis˜ oes das ﬁrmas (baseadas em expectativas adaptativas)
e seus efeitos geram trajet´ orias em aberto. Embora os resultados
⋆ This paper is part of an integrated research project supported by
CNPq (Brazil’s National Research Council). Ana Cristina Reif Vis-
conti, a PhD student also working in the project, is co-responsible for
all macro sections. The sectoral part of the model draws heavily on
Possas and Koblitz (2001).
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de simula¸ c˜ ao apresentados neste artigo dˆ eem apenas uma breve
id´ eia das trajet´ orias geradas pelo modelo, um resultado geral ro-
busto ´ e obtido: o comportamento c´ ıclico do PIB e de seus prin-
cipais componentes agregados.
1 Introduction and theoretical assumptions
This paper presents a micro-macro multisectoral evolutionary
simulation model that combines neo-Schumpeterian evolution-
ary microfoundations with some post-Keynesian and Kaleckian
assumptions and exhibits some preliminary results of simulation
runs made on selected issues. The main objective of the model is
to put together analytical elements that may be useful to inves-
tigate dynamic properties of capitalist economies which depend
mainly on micro-macro relations, with a special regard to the
analysis of economic development. It is our belief that very im-
portant complementary insights and results can be drawn from
combining these approaches 1 . As a starting point, both theoret-
ical ﬁelds share the rejection of two neoclassical foundations: (i)
substantive rationality; and (ii) equilibrium of agents and mar-
kets.
Concerning rational decision processes, both ﬁelds assume (or at
least are compatible with) bounded and procedural rationality, as
developed by Simon (1983), through which instrumental ratio-
nality may be reconciled with hard uncertainty (in the sense of
Knight and Keynes). As is well known, the latter is supposed to
be a feature of economic environments where irreducible infor-
mation and competence gaps (in both cognitive and computa-
tional senses) can emerge. In such context, rationality involves
1 For recent attempts see Verspagen (2002) and a survey by Llerena
and Lorentz (2003).
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“satisﬁcing” (apud Simon) kinds of sub-optimal solutions that
may lead to strategies based on routines and conventions (Heiner
(1983); Nelson and Winter (1982)).
As for the rejection of the notion of equilibrium, neo-
Schumpeterian and post-Keynesian approaches usually share the
view that disequilibria and coordination failures are normal in a
market economy. But this amounts to assuming, in more formal
terms, a nonergodic and nonstationary economic environment,
in which rational agents can make systematic forecasting mis-
takes, as opposed to the rational expectation hypothesis (Vercelli
(1991), p. 154-5). In particular, for the traditional neo-Keynesian
economic growth and ﬂuctuations theories up to the 60’s, dise-
quilibrium was essential in explaining capitalist economic dy-
namics, either in the more conventional interpretation as caus-
ing the propagation of ﬂuctuations around a trend of moving
equilibrium, or even when such trend is seen as irreducible to
an equilibrium in any intelligible sense (Kalecki (1954); Possas
(1983), Possas (1999)).
Both kinds of theories also admit that capitalist economies show
regularities that may reduce uncertainty (without eliminating
it) and allow long run decisions to be made, thus mitigating
the eﬀects of potential instability (Vercelli (1991), ch. 5; Possas
(1993). But these regularities do not prevent capitalist economies
from exhibiting nonlinearities originated from cumulative deci-
sions and their structural eﬀects (technological paths with tech-
nical progress and learning, synergies, etc.), which may cause
strong structural instability. Technical progress and correspond-
ing technological trajectories (Dosi (1982), Dosi (1984)) is prob-
ably the main dynamic process causing such eﬀects in the long
run, and not just through their direct innovative impacts. At the
same time, they usually increase dependence on existing assets,
acting as a source of increasing returns and sunk costs that cre-
ate path dependence and lock-in eﬀects in long run paths. Stable
institutions may induce similar eﬀects, although more complex
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and less studied by economists.
Main contributions from the neo-Schumpeterian evolution-
ary approach (Nelson and Winter (1982); Dosi (1984)) are in-
corporated by including explicitly in the model its two theoret-
ical cornerstones: (i) behavior diversity among agents, endoge-
nously generated through search of opportunities to innovate;
and (ii) a selection of ﬁrms, strategies and/or technologies ba-
sically through market competition, for which no reference to
equilibrium is needed.
Feedback between strategies and selection through the market
(or other institutions) entails an endogenous industrial dynam-
ics. Industrial structure and performance emerge from this in-
teraction across patterns of technological change that may shape
technological trajectories (Dosi (1982), Dosi (1984)). A success-
ful innovation allows a ﬁrm to reach competitive advantages and
fetch larger proﬁts and/or market shares, thus raising asym-
metries not only in performance variables, but also in market
structure (Dosi (1984), Dosi (1988)). Iterative processes based on
change in parameters and/or in expectations by ﬁrms give place
to open ended dynamic paths without any equilibrium trend,
where not even self-organizing order or regularities are necessar-
ily expected to be found.
In spite of being largely unpredictable, we believe that such long
run trajectories can be successfully studied through simulations
based on speciﬁc hypotheses concerning parameters and initial
conditions. In fact, the performance of simulation exercises to in-
vestigate the basic dynamic properties of economic market pro-
cesses of change has become a typical feature of the evolutionary
neo-Schumpeterian research program, since one cannot expect
analytical solutions usually to emerge for such complex system
modelling - except under seriously restrictive assumptions, which
can bring them close to irrelevance.
A surge of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary models trying to an-
alyze sectoral dynamics along these lines emerged in the last
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two decades 2 . The path breaking work of Nelson and Winter
(1982) paved the way for a family of models of Schumpeterian
competition. In the second round of these models, by the be-
ginning of the 90’s, there was a split within evolutionary/neo-
Schumpeterian models: (1) “microdynamic models”, related to
industrial trajectories with technological change; and (2) “en-
dogenous growth models”, more related to macroeconomic is-
sues, clearly as a counterpoint to neoclassical endogenous growth
models. But in spite of the eﬀort to include important elements
left out by neoclassical growth models, such models still present
a serious ﬂaw - there is no underlying economic structure, es-
sential to any macroeconomic analysis, including the sectoral
interrelation among consumption, investment and intermediate
goods. The transition from micro to macro levels is done without
macro-sectoral mediations between the ﬁrms and the economy
as a whole, either through input-output relations or through in-
come generation and ﬁnal demand. In a few words, it means
that these models have no macroeconomic level of analysis. The
importance of such sectoral interrelations, however, was stressed
by some evolutionary authors: “the structure of input-output,
as well as the untraded technological interdependencies of each
economy, can be regarded as a huge feedback machine that am-
pliﬁes, transforms or smoothes technological and demand im-
pulses generated in any part of the economy, transmitting them
to the rest of the system in ways which are both sector-speciﬁc
and country- (or region-) speciﬁc” (Dosi et al. (1990), p. 108).
2 For a survey see Dosi (1988), Nelson (1994), Nelson (1995) and
Saviotti and Metcalfe (1991).
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2 Main features of the model
Multisectoral model. Input-output (sector × sector) matrices are
employed together with other expenditure matrices - consump-
tion (sector × personal income class) and incremental
capital/output (sector × sector) - to endogenize main compo-
nents of ﬁnal demand. At the income generation side, matrices
of income appropriation within classes (functional income class
× sector) and of personal income appropriation (personal income
class × functional income class) are deﬁned. Other components
of ﬁnal demand, as exports and government expenses, are left
exogenous.
Dynamic model. It generates trajectories in discrete time (pe-
riods). Since causality is based on decisions to produce and to
spend (eﬀective demand), no equilibrium positions are ever re-
quired. The use of given matrix coeﬃcients do not prevent dy-
namic modeling, because it only requires such coeﬃcients being
ﬁxed during each simulation period, while it is possible to change
them between periods according to some established rules. Since
periods are deﬁned as a time lapse between consecutive decisions
(production, investment, consumption), this assumption poses
no consistency problem, given that decisions in any case could
only be revised by the end of each period.
Firms are the basic units. Each ﬁrm belongs only to one sector.
Structural changes in each sector are endogenously dependent on
ﬁrms’ behavior, especially as a result of technological and strate-
gic diversity 3 . Conversely, ﬁrms try to adapt to market con-
ditions through feedback mechanisms. Some basic features are:
(i) prices are decided by ﬁrms according to expected markups,
3 Based on the sectoral evolutionary model in Possas and Koblitz
(2001). But while in that case the only sector was modelled as a
science based one, in the present case sectors are widely distributed
accross Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy.
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subject to endogenous change due to strategic market concerns;
(ii) eﬀective demand causality in production decisions and sales
(i.e. absence of market supply and demand equilibrium) involves
distinguishing between output and sales, as well as putting em-
phasis on short period expectations concerning sales, assumed
to be endogenous (extrapolative); and (iii) investment decisions
follow basically the same rule, but allowing for an important au-
tonomous component related to technical progress, and impos-
ing ﬁnancial debt constraints. These mechanisms can be more
deeply explored within the multisectoral structure, which allows
treating as endogenous some important elements which other-
wise could only be ﬁxed exogenously.
More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms’ strategies and decisions can be divided
in three subsystems:
(i) production, prices and proﬁts;
(ii) investment;
(iii) technological search.
In the ﬁrst one, basic “eﬀective demand” elements are drawn
from Possas (1983), Possas (1984): production decisions are
based on expected sales for the production period, extrapolated
from the average of some previous periods 4 . As to prices, the
present model assumes each sector to be an oligopoly with some
degree of price competition as well as of product diﬀerentiation,
following a version of Kalecki’s price model (1954, ch. 1), in which
actual price is a weighted average of the price corresponding to
the expected markup and the industry average price, but subject
to change according to a feedback from the ﬁrm’s competitive
performance.
Investment decision rules on new capacity are also drawn from
Possas (1983), Possas (1984), based on extrapolated expected
sales from some previous (investment) periods but limited by
4 The exceptions are ﬁrms in the intermediate and capital goods
sectors, which produce according to their current orders.
8 EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.5, n.3, p.1–43, Dec. 2004A Multisectoral Micro-Macrodynamic Model
a debt constraint following Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk
(1954, ch. 8). Wider ﬁnancial features are included in these deci-
sions to capture the inﬂuence of assets and liabilities structure of
the ﬁrm, represented by debt/equity ratio, retained proﬁts and
liquidity demand.
Lastly, technological search combines diﬀerent approaches: both
innovative and imitative searches follow a stochastic process as
in Nelson and Winter (1982); and a learning process is also in-
cluded drawing on the vintage model by Silverberg et al. (1988),
from which a payback period criterion for equipment replace-
ment decisions is also applied.
Interactions at the sectoral level. Demand for each sector is in
part determined endogenously by ﬁrms and household decisions
to spend and in part exogenously by exports and government
expenditure, and is divided among ﬁrms by a “replicator” dy-
namic equation. Production and investment decisions by each
ﬁrm determine, respectively, the demand for intermediate and
for capital goods, and household decisions determine demand
for consumption goods.
Consumption is a function of the average income of each income
class, assumed to be linear and to have higher lags and lower
propensity to consume for higher income classes. The income
ﬂowing to each class is calculated as a proportion of the total
amount of wages and distributed proﬁts. The distribution of the
value added between wages and proﬁts in each sector is a func-
tion of the average markup and the unit wage, which can be
assumed to change across periods.
Exogenous blocks. In addition to the above endogenous core, the
model also involves three partially exogenous blocks or “sectors”
treated separately: foreign sector (trade and capital ﬂows); gov-
ernment (public expenditure, taxes and economic policy); and
a ﬁnancial sector (debts, capital investment and interest rates).
This treatment allows an easier setting of speciﬁc simulation as-
sumptions concerning strategic areas for macrodynamics and,
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in particular, for economic development. A multicountry model
could be a future extension of the model, therefore endogenizing
the foreign sector.
3 The model 5
In its general speciﬁcation, the model deﬁnes an economy with
m income classes (1,...,h...,m), p sectors (1,...,...,p), at least
three, n ﬁrms in each sector (1,...,i,...,n), each one initially con-
taining l capital goods (1,...,j,...l). Following one of the present
trends in neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary modelling, the model
was built and the simulations were run on the software Labora-
tory for Simulation Development (LSD), details of which can be







i,t (1 + σ) − x
s
i,t−1 (1)
subject to 0 ≤ x∗
i,t ≤ ¯ xi,t,
where σ is exogenously ﬁxed. 6 The production decision x∗
i,t at
the beginning of period t is aimed at two goals: (i) to meet the
expected demand for sales xe
i,t at the end of the production pe-
riod beginning at t; and (ii) to keep the stock xs
i,t at a safe level to
cope with unexpected demand ﬂuctuations, which is assumed as
5 Although the complete model involves all the equations described
below, not all will be used in every simulation run.
6 In the simulations, σ = 0,1. This and other ﬁxed parameters were
deﬁned by “educated guesses” and are assumed to be the same across
ﬁrms, except when otherwise stated.
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a ﬁxed proportion of sales, σ. 7 Production is limited by existing
productive capacity ¯ xi,t, measured in production units. Since dif-
ferent equipment units have diﬀerent productivities, we assume
the most eﬃcient ones to be used ﬁrst.
In the capital good sectors each ﬁrm produces based on current
orders, kei,t, its planned production being equal to the previous






subject to 0 ≤k x∗
i,t ≤ ¯ xi,t.
1A. Expected sales




i,t = ei,t−1 + γ (ei,t−1 − ei,t−2) (2)
withγ exogenously ﬁxed. 10
7 The production decision follows Metzler (1941); see Gandolfo
(1985), [p.90], and Possas (1983).
8 Since planned production is the basis on which every sector decides
its demand for intermediate goods, planned production of intermedi-
ate goods also has to be based on past orders, and eﬀective production
on current orders.
9 Gandolfo (1985), p, 95, suggests that this equation was originally
proposed by Goodwin in 1947.
10 In the simulations, γ = 0.5.
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Block 2: Total sectoral demand and ﬁrms’ demand
2A. Total sectoral demand
Total demand is speciﬁed diﬀerently for each sector, so it will
be presented separately. Note that in the case of both capital
and intermediate goods, total demand will determine planned
production.
(i) Intermediate goods sectors
The eﬀective production of each ﬁrm in these sectors is con-
strained both by its productive capacity and by the stock of
intermediate goods it holds. The amount of inputs produced by
sector z necessary to meet the planned production of ﬁrm i is






























t is the (p × pn) matrix of required inputs; Ai
t and Am
t
are the input-output (p × pn) matrices of domestic, ai
z,i,t, and
imported, am
z,i,t, technical coeﬃcients; and ˆ x∗
t is the diagonal ma-
trix (pn × pn) of planned production of each ﬁrm i,x∗
i,t.
If the required amount of each intermediate good is available, the
quantities spent will be those indicated on the columns of the
matrix Xin
t ; otherwise, only a proportion 11, ρi,t, of these quan-
tities will be used for each ﬁrm i. Therefore, the total demand
11 This proportion is equal to lowest ratio for the ﬁrm j of the avail-
able intermediate goods of sector i,xid
i,j,t, and the amount required,
xin
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for domestic intermediate goods at t + 1 is determined by each
ﬁrm’s planned production, x∗
i,t+1, again calculated by an extrap-





















i,t (1 + γiλi,t) (5)
where iei
t is the vector (p × 1) of domestic demand for interme-
diate goods sectors, Xisr
t is the (p × pn) matrix of the unused
stock of intermediate goods 13 and u is a column unitary vector.
(ii) Consumption goods sectors
The domestic demand for consumption goods is determined by
households’ income, according to their income class, and govern-
ment expenses. The consumption of each class is assumed to be
a linear function, with increasing lags 14 and decreasing marginal
propensity to consume, of the average real income of each class,
, plus a ﬁxed autonomous consumption:
ce
i
t = C¯ y
r + C
A¯ u + c
g
t (6)
where C and CA are (p×m) matrices of the marginal propensity
12 In the case of intermediate goods sectors, since they produce based
on these orders, the remaining stock of inputs is not deducted since
it is not yet determined.
13 The columns corresponding to intermediate sectors in the matrix
Xisr
t are zeros.
14 The simulations assume m = 4. For class A, a 4 period lag is
assumed; for class B, 3; for class C, 2; and, for class D, 1.
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to consume and autonomous consumption, respectively, ¯ yr is the
vector (m×1) of the average real income of each class; and cg is
the vector (p × 1) of the government consumption measured in
output units of each sector.
(iii) Capital goods sectors
The investment decisions on ﬁxed capital (for expansion and re-
placement of productive capacity) have two major components:
expected sales and the ﬁnancial risk of increasing in-
debtedness 15 . Firms take these decisions at every investment
period, which by assumption equals six production periods 16 ,
corresponding to the time lag needed to produce, install, and
start operating the new equipments. In order to be implemented,
such decisions must be ﬁnancially feasible, i.e., the ﬁrm must be
capable of paying for the new capital goods either with its own
and/or with borrowed resources, as it will be explained below.
A proportion 17 of the aggregate demand for capital goods is for
imported ones; thus, the orders received by the domestic cap-











t is the (p×1) vector of orders received by the domestic
sectors; kXt is the (p×pn) matrix formed by capital goods total
demand vectors; kxi,t; km is the (pn × 1) vector of import coef-
ﬁcients for capital goods; Igt is the (p×1) vector of government
investment expenditure and ˆ p
−1
t−1 is the (p × p) diagonal matrix
15 That is, the debt/capital (or debt/equity) ratio.
16 This version of the model assumes the same investment period for
all sectors, although decisions are not simultaneous.
17 The ratio is sector speciﬁc; however, in the standard simulations it
is set to 5% for all sectors.
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of the inverse of last period average prices 18 .
(iv) Eﬀective orders
Finally, eﬀective orders for each sector are determined by the














t is the (p × 1) vector of each sector’s import orders,
deﬁned below at the foreign sector block.
2B. Firms’ demand: replicator dynamic equation and competi-
tiveness
The discrete formulation presented here was developed by Kwas-
nicki and Kwasnicka (1996), based on Silverberg’s (1987) adap-
tation to ﬁrms’ competition of the original equation developed


















such that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and Et =
Pn
i=1 Ei,tSi,t−1,
where Ei is a competitiveness index for ﬁrm i, based on price
and delivery delay.
18 Given technical indivisibilities, the eﬀective level of government
investment is determined by the integer component.
19 In general the sectors are specialized, which means that only one
of the three domestic components is positive.
20 This parameter is speciﬁc to each sector. A discussion on the con-
sistency of this equation is presented in Possas and Koblitz (2001).
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where pi is the price and ddi is the delivery delay for ﬁrm i, and
ε1 and ε2 are respectively the ﬁrm’s competitiveness elasticities
relative to price and to delivery delay.
The above deﬁnition is consistent with Silverberg’s [(1987), p.
121] comment that relative, not absolute, price diﬀerences may
drive a customer away from a seller to another. Silverberg in-
troduces the price logarithm in his deﬁnition to keep up with
that observation. In our model this device is unnecessary since a
diﬀerent replicator equation is used: while in Silverberg’s model
market share depends on the absolute diﬀerence between indi-
vidual and average competitiveness 21 , here it is the ratio be-
tween individual and average competitiveness that fulﬁlls this
role. Therefore, in deﬁning competitiveness as a function of price,
the market share for each ﬁrm will be determined by relative
prices.
Block 3: Firms’ orders, actual production and sales
3A. Firms’ orders
Eﬀective orders received by a ﬁrm depend on total sector de-
mand, et, and on the ﬁrm’s market share sit, determined by the
replicator dynamic equation, under the eﬀect of ﬁrm’s competi-
tiveness:
ei,t = si,tet (11)
21 The equation used by Silverberg is
dfi
dt = A(Ei − E)fi, where fi is
the market share of ﬁrm i.
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However, orders actually received by an individual ﬁrm might
diﬀer from this level if some ﬁrm is unable to meet its orders and
other ﬁrms in the same sector have excess supply. The resulting
excess demand is divided among remaining ﬁrms on the basis of
their market share ranking.
3B. Actual production and sales
Actual production is planned production subject to the interme-
diate goods constraint:
xt = ˆ x
∗
t × ρt (12)
where xt is the (pn × 1) vector of the eﬀective production, ρt
the (pn × 1) vector of elements ρi,t and ˆ x∗
t was deﬁned before.
In the case of ﬁrms belonging to an intermediate sector, actual
production is not based on planned production, but on actual
orders, as in capital goods sector. In this case, however, the aim
is not only to meet the domestic and foreign current orders,
but also to keep the stock xs
i,t at an acceptable level, in face of





i eit × (1 + σi) − x
s
i,t (13)
subject to 0 ≤i x∗
i,t ≤ xi,t−1.
Actual sales xv
t are determined by the eﬀective orders, which
may or may not correspond to the expectations that previously
deﬁned the level of production. This interaction between sales
and production over time creates a mechanism of dynamic in-
duction over the subsequent production decisions, via changes
on the expected behavior of future sales. Obviously sales level
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cannot exceed the production level plus existing stocks:
x
v
t = et, (14)
subject to 0 ≤ xv
t ≤ xt + xs
t−1.





t−1 + xt − x
v
t (15)
The stock of intermediate goods available for next period pro-
duction is given by the amount not used in the current period,
xisr











where i,t is the proportion of the orders that sector i could meet;
and are sector j imports of sector i goods. If eﬀective orders (in
the ﬁrst round) received by a ﬁrm exceed the sum of its planned
production and available stocks, the ﬁrm will incur in a delivery
delay, which will have a negative impact on its competitiveness in







Block 4: Prices and costs
4A. Price decisions
22 Some degree of substitutability between domestic and imported
goods of the same sector is assumed.
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The price equation used here, as shown elsewhere 23 , is a discrete
version of Silverberg’s, consistent with the version speciﬁed be-
fore for the replicator equation and it is also identical to the price
equation used by Kalecki (1954), ch. 1 in his analysis of the “de-
gree of monopoly” of a ﬁrm under imperfect competition:
pi,t = θp
d










iui is the ﬁrm’s desired price for each period, i.e.,
the price that results from applying the desired markup kd
i over
the unit variable cost ui; and ki is the eﬀective markup corre-
sponding to the eﬀective price pi.
As mentioned above, the latter equation is exactly the one used
by Kalecki (1954), ch. 1. Both Kalecki and Silverberg look at
their equations as simple extensions of the so-called “full cost
principle” to oligopolistic conditions, where it is impossible for
ﬁrms to ignore each other’s prices. Alternatively, it can be un-
derstood as one of the determinants of markup in oligopoly: as a
sort of compromise between the desired markup by a ﬁrm (or its
long run strategic markup) and current competitive conditions.
While low cost ﬁrms enjoy the advantage of making additional
proﬁts in the short run, in excess of what would result from
applying the strategic markup, high cost ﬁrms sacriﬁce their de-
sired markup for keeping their market share (Silverberg (1987),
p.130).
Another behavioral implication of this equation is that, since the
average price is weighted by market shares, larger ﬁrms will have
23 Possas and Koblitz (2001).
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a greater inﬂuence on average market price, thus playing a kind
of price leadership, while small ﬁrms can substantially reduce
prices without producing a large impact on market price (to an
amount required, for instance, to start a price war).
Each ﬁrm’s unit variable cost in a given period, uit, is the sum of
unit input costs mi, assumed constant as a function of quantity
produced, and unit labor cost, which depends on the nominal
wage rate wi (assumed constant over time and with the amount
produced) and on the ﬁrm’s average productivity, πi (see below):














t are (n×1) domestic (sector average) and foreign
price vectors, respectively, and ert is the exchange rate 24 .
4B. Technological routines and productivity
Average labor productivity for each ﬁrm varies over time as a
function of (i) the investment on ﬁxed capital and the degree of
productive capacity utilization; (ii) the R&D strategy adopted;
and (iii) the eﬃciency of the learning-by-doing process.
Fixed capital stock at any period is heterogeneous, composed of
equipments requiring diﬀerent labor productivity to operate, so
that the ﬁrm’s average productivity depends on which capital
goods are being used and on their degree of utilization. Each
equipment’s productivity at a given period, on its turn, results
from the combination of the outcome of the ﬁrm’s technological
24 For simpliﬁcation, the exchange rate is being kept constant.
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search at the moment it was ordered (more details later) and of
the improvements obtained while using it, associated with the
adjustment processes that must be done, along with the men-
tioned learning by doing process 25 . These advantages 26 , how-
ever, are balanced by two other factors also present in the model:
(i) the learning-by-doing eﬀects were realistically assumed to be
limited; and (ii) they are speciﬁc to each equipment/technology,
so that when the latter is replaced, the ﬁrm enters into a diﬀerent
“learning curve” 27 .





i,j,t (initial productivity of equipment j of ﬁrm i) is de-
termined in Block 6 below, and hi,j,t is deﬁned afterwards.
(b) Learning eﬀect (learning-by-doing):












25 Scherer and Ross (1990), ch. 4, pp.97-98. Speciﬁc product
economies of scale are those associated with the amount produced
and sold of only one product.
26 The diﬀerence of these advantages among sectors will be taken
into account. According to Scherer and Ross, op. cit., “...some of
the product lines in which learning-by-doing is most important (such
as semiconductors, aircraft, and computers) are also characterized by
rapid technological obsolescence of product designs. The development
of a completely new design often permits an initially handicapped
producer to jump to a new learning curve in a position of equality or
even superiority” (p.372).
27 More details in Scherer and Ross (1990) and Possas and Koblitz
(2001).
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.5, n.3, p.1–43, Dec. 2004 21Mario Luiz Possas and Esther Dweck
The parameters z and τ of this equation represent respectively
the growth rate of the equipment’s initial productivity that can
be reached through learning-by-doing, and the speed with which
it can reach this level 28 .
Block 5: Investment decisions and ﬁnancial constraint
Investment decisions determine both the ﬁrm’s average produc-
tivity and the extent to which it can grow in the long run. The
model considers two components – apart from technological im-
provements – of an investment decision: capacity expansion and
capacity replacement. The latter can be explained either by a
thorough physical depreciation or by technological obsolescence,
or both. In order to be implemented, such decisions must be ﬁ-
nancially feasible, i.e., the ﬁrm must be capable of paying for
the new capital goods either with its own and/or with borrowed
resources, subject to a given precautional demand for liquid as-
sets and to an upper indebtedness bound. These ﬁnancial vari-
ables act as a constraint to the ﬁrm’s desired investment. This
Kaleckian (and partly Keynesian) provision is a clear improve-
ment upon the traditional “accelerator” mechanism. The main
diﬀerences from our model as compared to Kalecki’s (1954, ch.
9) are: (i) the introduction of a ﬁnancial constraint, instead of
adding it as a continuous variable, on the investment equation;
and (ii) the “accelerator” component itself, adapted to cope with
the necessary adjustments of the degree of capacity utilization
together with the observed growth projection (Possas 1987) 29.
At the same time, detailed descriptions of the investment deci-
sions made by behaviorist economists 30 seem to be largely con-
28 Both parameters are given as initial conditions.
29 Possas (1987) made a detailed critical discussion on investment
determinants in Kalecki’s model of 1954, as well as on the accelerator
and for the original formulation of the equation used here.
30 See Cyert et al. (1979) and Bromiley (1986), quoted in Possas and
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sistent with investment decision routines and with their relation
with ﬁnancial variables, proposed by the present model 31 .
5A. Investment decisions
Investment decisions are taken at the end of each investment
period (time interval between consecutive investment decisions),
which is assumed to comprise six production periods each.
Decision making starts with a forecast of average sales for the
next production periods [t+6; t+12] when the new capacity, re-
sulting from current investment, will be operative – by deﬁnition,
its “construction period”, also assumed to be equal to the invest-
ment period. This forecast is a simple extrapolation of average
sales of the corresponding previous investment periods. Expected





T+1 = eT + γ (eT − eT−1) (23)
where eT = average orders in the current investment period 33 ,
by the end of which decision is being made. Assuming that the






T+1 + γ (eT − eT−1) = eT + 2γ (eT − eT−1) (24)
In order to determine the desired productive capacity one needs
Koblitz (2001).
31 For instance, concerning the role of ﬁnancial variables as con-
straints to desired investment, see Cyert et al. (1979), op. cit., in
Cyert and De-Groot (1987), p.134; apud Possas and Koblitz (2001).
32 In this block of equations, subscript T refers to the investment
period, where T = t/6.
33 The average orders over the last 6 production periods.
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to know the production level that is expected to be necessary,
which, as usual, has not only to meet expected sales, but also a
given stock level. The latter was established before as a fraction σ
of expected sales. As a safety margin for possible forecast errors
and unforeseen demand ﬂuctuations, the above result is taken
as a fraction α of planned capacity. Finally, to obtain the varia-
tion in planned capacity which will justify investment, one needs
only to subtract the existing capacity. Thus, desired productive








i,T+2 − (1 − δ)xi,T (25)
where △
−∗
xi,T is the desired increase in productive capacity xit.
Now, the value of desired gross investment in ﬁxed capital is ob-
tained by multiplying the desired increase in capacity, in addition













5B. Financial constraint to investment 35








F I is the amount of the internal funds (or cash ﬂow), result-
34 This sets the maximum level of required capacity, in order to meet
product demand and stock replacement needs.
35 The ﬁnancial constraint used in this model was largely inspired by
Wood (1975), and also employed in Possas (1984). For more details
see Possas and Koblitz (2001).
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ing from deducting taxes and distributed proﬁts from net prof-
its (which deﬁnes retained proﬁts P R), and adding depreciation
funds. F X are the external funds that a ﬁrm may borrow up to a
given acceptable rate g of debt on total capital, exogenously as-
sumed in the simulations as ﬁxed and equal among ﬁrms. These
funds will only be used when internal ones are insuﬃcient to
fund the amount of desired investment 36 . The ﬁrm is also sup-
posed to keep a given amount of liquid resources as a means of
avoiding short run borrowing due to sales forecasting errors. A∗
i.t
is the amount of desired additional liquid funds as a proportion
φ of the already existing liquid capital stock 37 .
When the ﬁrm’s rate of debt on capital exceeds a given risk
threshold, which is much above the acceptable level g (in the
simulations, 90%), the model assumes it has failed and it will
thus be eliminated from the market.
Now, a ﬁnancial constraint on the desired value of total invest-
ment can be applied, depending on a number of factors, as shown
in the above equation. To simplify matters, we can identify the
following main alternatives:
(i) The amount of total ﬁnancial funds available for investment
is negative (Fi,t < 0).
This situation may result from high losses, high indebtedness,
liquidity squeeze or a combination thereof. Generally it will take
place if F I is small or negative; and the ﬁrm’s reaction will de-
pend on its stock of liquid assets. Should it be insuﬃcient to cover
36 F∗X may be positive – when external resources may be added to
internal ones to ﬁnance investment without exceeding an acceptable
level for the rate of debt on capital; or negative, otherwise – in which
case part of the internal funds should be used to reduce the debt.
This debt adjustment is made stepwise to reﬂect some tolerance of
the ﬁrm to exceed its debt limit so as to avoid sacriﬁcing the whole
desired investment.
37 A∗
i.t may also be positive or negative, whether or not an increase
in liquid resources is needed.
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(the negative value of) Fi,t, the ﬁrm will use it up to reduce the
debt or to reduce the impact of F I in case of loss. Otherwise,
liquid funds will be reduced in the amount of Fi,t. In any case the
investment in new capacity, as well as that eventually designed
to technological updating, will amount to zero.
(ii) The amount of total ﬁnancial funds available for investment
is positive or null (Fi,t ≥ 0).
Two situations may happen:
a) available funds are less than or equal to desired investment. In
this case, the ﬁrm will invest the amount available, taking into
account the technical indivisibility of investment (the minimum
unit of capacity was set as 10 production units in the model).
Eﬀective ﬁnancial ﬂows (external funds plus liquid assets invest-
ment) will equal the values that entered in the calculation of
Fi,t, and possible residues due to ﬁxed capital indivisibility will
be used to increase liquid assets;
b) available funds are greater than desired investment. The ﬁrm
will be able to invest the desired amount, and the remaining sur-
plus will be destined (when required) to technological updating
of the equipment. If these funds are completely used up, eﬀective
ﬁnancial ﬂows will equal their initial values.
Lastly, desired investment in technological updating of the equip-
ment will be determined by a common payback rule for each unit








￿ ≤ b (28)
where πi,j,t is the productivity of equipment j of ﬁrm i and b the
payback period.
If after this stage there still remains some liquid surplus, its
destination will depend on its amount. The ﬁrm is supposed to
use its own funds in the ﬁrst place, so if the surplus is greater
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than or equal to the external available funds, the ﬁrm will not
run into new debt and any remaining surplus will be kept as
liquid assets. Conversely, should the external funds be greater
the same rule would apply: the ﬁrm will only use external funds
to the amount strictly necessary to invest.
Block 6: Frontier shift and technological search
Technological search by any ﬁrm is accomplished through process
R&D. The assumption made here is that the industrial sector be-
ing modeled introduces technical change basically embodied in
the equipment ordered, but at the same time internal R&D is
assumed to be crucial for design and technical improvement of
the equipment, through learning-by-doing (in K. Pavitt’s (1984)
taxonomy, it would correspond closer to “scale intensive”, with
some elements of “science based”, sectors). The innovation and
diﬀusion (imitation) processes follow closely those 2 stage pro-
cesses proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982), ch. 12 38 .
The equations are as follows:
(a) Productivity associated with an imitation draw: 1st. stage













2nd. stage – probability of imitative success:
Pr(dm = 1) = 1 − exp(−ρm,ipi,txi,tam) (30)
38 In the simulations, among the total of eight ﬁrms three kinds of
ﬁrms were assumed to exist: ﬁrms numbered 1 and 2 are “strong” in-
novators (higher R&D innovative spending than imitative spending);
those numbered 3 to 5 “weak” innovators (the inverse proportion);
and ﬁrms 6 through 10 are imitators (only imitative R&D).
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where dm is a dummy variable representing success (dm = 1) or
failure (dm = 0) of the imitative draw; ρmi is the share of revenue
spent in imitative R&D; and am is a sector-speciﬁc exogenous
parameter of “technological opportunity” of imitative success 39 .
(b) Productivity associated with an innovation draw:
1st. stage – probability of innovative success:
Pr(dn = 1) = 1 − exp(−ρn,ipi,txi,tan) (31)
where dn is a dummy variable representing success (dn = 1) or
failure (dn = 0) of the innovative draw; ρni is the share of revenue
spent in innovative R&D; and an is a sector-speciﬁc exogenous
parameter of “technological opportunity” of innovative success.
2nd. stage – productivity obtained by innovation, πN














where µ and σ are given exogenously.
The ﬁnal choice, that will deﬁne the productivity of the ﬁrm’s
“internal” best practice πF
i,t, will be the technology with the high-














Block 7: Income generation
39 To be precise, this is not the only variable reﬂecting the degree
of technological opportunity of a given technology: the exogenous
productivity growth of the best practice may be interpreted in a
similar way, even more so since Nelson & Winter. To avoid ambiguity
we decided to call the latter eﬀect simply as “productivity gains” of
the technological frontier.
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The unit surplus, st, can be obtained subtracting from price the
indirect taxes and unit costs; however, its total amount can only
be deﬁned after sales:
st =
￿
I − ˆ τ
i
￿
pt − ϕt (34)
where ˆ τi is the diagonal matrix of indirect tax rates, charged over
the sector’s revenue. Total surplus is deﬁned ex post, multiplying
its unit value by total sales. The aggregate amount of surplus in






The total wage, TWt, analogously, is deﬁned aggregating wages
through sectors, including public sector wages W g. To simplify, a
ﬂexible labor contract is implicitly assumed, that is, the amount
of labor employed is determined by the level of production and
there is no labor supply constraint. Wage unit is subject to











WTt = wtxt + W
g (37)
The GDP in each production period is given by the sum of total
wage and surplus with the indirect taxes:
Yt = TSt + TWt + T
i
t (38)
Finally, the two functional income classes must be converted into
m personal income classes. This is done by a matrix (m × 2) of
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personal income appropriation (personal income class × func-














where ˆ τd is the (m× m) diagonal matrix of the income tax rate
and DPt is total distributed proﬁts.
The real income of each class, yr
h,t, is determined by deﬂating the









where the index is a Paasche one whose weights are given by the
marginal propensity to consume domestic and imported goods
by each class.
Block 8: Public and foreign sectors
8A. Public sector
Government, as mentioned above, is introduced in a partially ex-
ogenous and very simpliﬁed way. The main components of this
block are: government expenses and income and indirect tax rev-
enues. Interest and exchange rate are ﬁxed in this preliminary
version, as well as the distribution of the expenses. The latter,
based on a surplus target 40 , are determined every period by the
diﬀerence between the expected taxes and the target surplus.
The former is calculated by past tax revenue, corrected by the
40 A rule for changing endogenously this target may be subject to
simulations.
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expected growth rate. Government expenses, g
g
t, are proportion-
ally divided into wages, consumption and investment:
Gt = g
T∗















t are (p × 1) vectors; cg, kg and wg the propor-
tions.
Government revenue is obtained from indirect and income (di-
rect) taxes. The indirect taxes are paid by sectors according
to their sales proceeds. Income taxes are applied over the to-
tal amount of personal income of each income class, with class-
speciﬁc rates.
8B. Foreign sector
The second partially exogenous block is the foreign sector, com-
posed, in this version, exclusively by the trade balance, supposed
to be identical to foreign balance of payments 41 42 .
Exports are determined by a ﬁxed coeﬃcient, χi, over the “rest
of the world” income, Y x
t (measured in domestic currency) and
the corresponding income elasticity on the world market, ηi. This
simple form captures both the general international situation, ex-
pressed by the world income, and the sector-speciﬁc conditions
expressed by the export coeﬃcient and elasticities. In order to
deﬁne the exports in terms of units of output, this value is di-
41 It does not include compensatory capital ﬂows. Contrary to many
models of balance of payments constraint, no assumption is made
about the trade balance.
42 The other components of foreign balance of payments will be in-
troduced in a later version of the model.
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t is the (1 × p) vector of export prices (in domestic cur-
rency) and ex
t the (p × 1) vector of exports from each sector.
Imports are determined in the same way as the domestic de-
mand. The intermediate goods imports are deﬁned by technical
coeﬃcients and planned production; the consumer goods imports
are deﬁned by a linear function with increasing lags 43 and de-
creasing marginal propensity; capital goods imports were already
explained.
Aggregate imports value in domestic currency is given by the
sum total imports by each sector multiplied by the respective
international prices and the exchange rate:






t is the (1 × p) vector of international prices and em
t
the (p × 1) vector of imports of products corresponding to each
sector. Finally, it is possible to determine the trade balance in
domestic currency, which in this preliminary version of the model
will be equal to the balance of payments.
43 The same lags as in domestic consumption.
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4 Preliminary simulation results
The simulation results presented in this section only give a very
brief idea of the trajectories generated by the model. Further
work will provide a more systematic analysis of the parameters
and initial conditions, as well as of the time series generated by
the simulations. Also, given the size of the model, a deeper analy-
sis will be made on each block separately. Nevertheless, since the
stochastic part of the model is very limited, the results of each
simulation run based on the standard or “benchmark” conditions
are analytically relevant. Models like this are basicaly determin-
istic, although highly path-dependent, being more sensitive to
initial conditions than to the random seed of the stochastic com-
ponent.
In the benchmark setup we assume p=4, n=10 and m=4; the
sectors are: consumption (one), intermediate (two) and capital
(one). All ﬁrms are identical in each sector except for technologi-
cal and price strategies, according to which they may be divided
in three groups: (i) strong innovators - which allocate a larger
part of R&D expenses to innovative search and put a higher
weight on desired price; (ii) weak innovators -a smaller part of
R&D to innovative search, but also a higher weight on desired
price; and (iii) pure imitators – all R&D to imitative search and
higher weight on average price.
As in the original multisectoral model of Possas (1984) and in the
tradition of Kalecki (1954), the main macrodynamic result of the
simulations using the benchmark setup, as shown below, is the
cyclical behavior of the GDP (ﬁg. 1). Fluctuations are relatively
stable, although their pattern, as expected, is more complex than
aggregate analytical models (ﬁg. 2). These results are observed
in many diﬀerent simulations, which are not reported here. But
two general points deserve attention.
Firstly, just like the traditional neo-Keynesian and Kaleckian
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models, the regularity of the main observed ﬂuctuations may
be explained, in very general lines, by the lagged dual eﬀect of
investment, stimulating demand in the short term through mul-
tiplier eﬀects and adding productive capacity in a longer term,
whose eventual utilization may exceed or lag the desired level,
propagating the original impulse. Secondly, a comparative analy-
sis of simulations under diﬀerent assumptions has shown that the
relative stability of the ﬂuctuations, unlike traditional aggregate
neo-Keynesian models, is due to a much more complex invest-
ment function, where the usually explosive accelerator eﬀect is
balanced by the inﬂuence of the degrre of capacity utilization
and by a very eﬀective ﬁnancial constraint.
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Fig. 5.
A special setting can be used to exhibit an important additional
dynamic property of the model, which recalls Kalecki’s (1954) re-
sults. The following ﬁgures show that, if all technological features
of the model are taken out, keeping only the dynamic compo-
nents related to “eﬀective demand” – i.e. to endogenous interac-
tion between production, sales, consumption and investment –,
it is capable of generating ﬂuctuations, but not a long run trend.
Of the main possible determinants of long run trend, the model
incorporates in this ﬁrst version exports, autonomous govern-
ment expenditures and an autonomous investment component.
These components, however, are introduced in a way that is un-
able to generate a signiﬁcant trend, as opposed to technological
autonomous components, which are responsible for a steady pos-
itive trend in real income in these simulations, as shown in ﬁg.
5.
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Fig. 6. Figure 6: with R&D
The co-movements of real GDP, consumption and investment
deserve also some comment. As shown in the ﬁgures below, al-
though both consumption and investment are pro-cyclical, the
latter ﬂuctuates more and the former less than GDP, which is
consistent with Keynesian view of investment being more volatile
and consumption more stable. This holds irrespectively of tech-
nological search being made or not, as can be seen in the ﬁgures
6 to 9.
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Fig. 8. Figure 5: without R&D
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Fig. 9. Figure 9: without R&D
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